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INTRODUCTION
The fine arts have undergone a revolution. Liberating waves
have swept art, music, and literature in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, empowering artists to experiment with anything and every-
thing. The overwhelming trend has been toward the subjective, expe-
riential, self-referential perspectives of performers, composers, and
painters. Form and structure were often cast aside if they impeded
the implementation of intensely personal visions.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see the astonishing enrich-
ment that resulted from this trend. It gave us Monet's Water Lilies and
Picasso's Cubism. Bach's contrapuntal melodies were succeeded by
Bart6k's sometimes discordant compositions inspired by folk music.
Poetry began emphasizing mood over rhyme and meter. These devel-
opments may alternately shock, enlighten, or challenge observers, but
there can be no question that they deepened the artistic conversation
and expanded the range of artistic expression available.
@ 2010 J. Harvie Wilkinson III. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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Given the strong tides of personal sensibility in artistic expression
and indeed in popular culture, it would be surprising if there were not
a strong temptation for judges to follow suit. Like the pounding tim-
pani that open Richard Strauss's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the drumbeat
of self-reference that has so enriched art has reached the ears of even
the more staid practitioners of law. As Justice Holmes famously
asserted at the beginning of The Common Law, "The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience."' It would hardly be expected,
of course, that judges would openly acknowledge the influence upon
them of the exaltation of self-expression in the fine arts. But then
again it would hardly be expected that a trend so prevalent in paint-
ing, sculpture, music, dance, theater, or architecture would somehow
leave judges immune from its influence.
Professor Jonathan Turley has made this point while discussing
national security law, noting that "[i]n many ways, the endeavors of
law and art seem to have converged . .. as the Court has moved from
more classic to more impressionistic interpretations of constitutional
provisions."2 However, the phenomenon is hardly limited to national
security. Judges feel a strong and understandable temptation, evinced
in evocations of judicial empathy, evolving social norms, and living
constitutionalism, to do justice as they feel it should be done rather
than adhering to the strictures of text and structure. Art's inspira-
tional power and its loosening of form and structure mightily
encourage this impulse. In fact, those jurists who reject formal
restraints in favor of freewheeling adjudication are the inheritors of
the artistic mantle, attempting to claim for judges the freedom artists
enjoy.
This form-loosening trend has produced some magnificent art,
and some may hope for similarly beneficent results in the duller con-
fines of law. But great art does not make good law. Art and law are
created through distinct processes and serve different purposes. Law
also commands the full power of the state, wielding ironically a power
both greater and lesser than the power of the arts.
These differences make it dangerous for law to imitate art's sub-
jective impulses and emotions. Law is not in the eye of the beholder.
The personal feelings that have ignited and revolutionized the arts
I OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009)
(1881).
2 SeeJonathan Turley, Art and the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Rise of the
Impressionist School of Constitutional Interpretation, 2003-2004 CATO SuP. CT. REV. 69, 70
(discussing the Supreme Court's recent national security decisions in Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426 (2004)).
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undermine the very foundations of law if cross-applied. Instead, law
should serve as the foil for art, providing stability and structure in a
society whose art should reflect the range of its emotions and ascend
the pinnacles of its passions.
To say that the difference between law and art is one of reason
versus feeling or tradition versus innovation is much too simple, but to
pretend profound differences do not exist would be naive as well.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly touches on the dra-
matic changes that have occurred in the arts during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries as subjective expressiveness replaced objective
form and structure. Part II discusses the significant temptation for
judges to borrow the structure-challenging subjectivity of the arts and
to apply it in the law. Finally, Part III explains why art and law are so
distinctive that a sense of mutual appreciation should not dissolve the
sense of distance that serves these respective callings well.
I. SUBJECTIVE ART
For centuries, from early Egyptian murals to Renaissance relig-
ious painting, art proceeded on the assumption that intense beauty
was often best achieved within highly stylized, symbolic, and allegori-
cal forms, many of which struck deep communal chords. Indeed,
much Egyptian art went so far as to strip the individual of any distin-
guishing features, the better to accomplish large public works or to
reinforce the hierarchical order of the state. Whether art served the
state, the church, or some wealthy patron, the primacy of the individ-
ual artist was not loudly proclaimed. To be sure, artists had distinctive
styles and chose distinctive subjects, but only-and this is crucial-
within bounds.
Few would disagree that artistic expression over the past two hun-
dred years has undergone a convulsive change. Throughout the fine
arts this change has been twofold. First, there has been a dramatic
loosening of form and structure in the artistic disciplines. In addition
to this loosening of technical requirements, art has experienced a
related, though distinct, rise in subjectivity and self-expression. A
brief look at these developments in painting and music helps to illus-
trate the rise of personal feeling and the fall of impersonal formalities.
A. Subjectivity in Painting and Artwork
The Impressionists and the painters who immediately preceded
them are a logical starting point in any discussion of the rise of the
subjective in the arts. Art is by definition an act of expression on some
level, but by the mid-nineteenth century some painters believed it had
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become stale and mechanical. "Proper" artists of the time tended to
emphasize carefully studied images of uplifting scenes (or at least
time-honored biblical or mythological tales), rendered in painstaking,
studio-applied layers of paint.
Artists such as Eugene Delacroix and later tdouard Manet began
to question these dogmatic formulations. They challenged the careful
outlining of figures, the archly formal poses in a composition, the stul-
tifying technicalities of light and shading.3 Instead, they painted what
they perceived and experienced. As one art historian described a
Delacroix painting of charging Arabic horsemen, "All the painter
wants is to make us partake in an intensely exciting moment, and to
share his joy in the movement and romance of the scene."4 This shift
from the formal recitation of a particular theme to the communica-
tion of feeling for its own sake was both liberating and controversial,
and that controversy only grew as younger artists continued to
experiment.
Matters came to a head in 1863 in Paris, then the undisputed
artistic center of the world.5 At the time, the Acad6mie des Beaux-
Arts controlled admission to the premier exhibition of the year, the
Salon de Paris. Artists whose compositions were displayed at the Salon
gained instant credibility and a healthy market for their work.6 As a
result, the Acad6mie enjoyed a role as arbiter of artistic standards,
which it chose to exercise by accepting only art that reflected "correct"
subjects, styles, and techniques. When the Acad6mie rejected a sur-
prisingly high percentage of the 1863 submissions,7 Emperor Napo-
leon III, nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, responded to protests by
decreeing that there should be a "Salon des Refus6s," or "exhibition
of rejects."8 The intent of this exhibition was to allow the rejected
artists to display their works in the gallery of public opinion.
3 See E.H. GOMBRICH, THE STORY OF ART 506 (16th ed. rev. 1995) (discussing
technique in Delacroix's paintings of Arabic and North African nomads).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 504 (describing Paris as the artistic capital of Europe).
6 SeeJOHN REWALD, THE HIsTORY OF IMPRESSIONISM 79 (4th rev. ed. 1973). The
influence of the Acaddmie was so strong that some patrons returned paintings and
forced artists to refund the purchase price if the artwork subsequently was rejected.
Id.
7 See id. Of some five thousand paintings submitted, three thousand were
rejected. As Rewald notes, "Nobody could remember a similar proportion of refus-
als." Id.
8 See id. at 80-81.
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In the short term, the exhibition was not a great success,9 at least
in part because members of the Acad6mie managed to place pieces
with the most potential to offend in positions of prominence.10
tdouard Manet's Luncheon on the Grass, at the time an especially con-
troversial image of a nude woman enjoying a casual picnic with two
young men in contemporary clothes, was given special prominence. 1
It scandalized viewers.12 Its bold assertion of an artist's right to paint
what he chose, using styles and methods that reflected what he saw,
typified the unorthodox approach that had caused the Acad6mie's
rejections in the first place.
But the Acad6mie's efforts to impose impersonal standards on
something so variable as personal vision foundered. A sense of new-
found freedom characterized the works of Manet and the painters
who followed, including Monet, Renoir, Degas, Cezanne, Pissarro,
and others. In their hands, the attack on inhibitions imposed by form
and structure upon artistic freedom proceeded apace. At least in part
as a response to the advent of photography and the corresponding
competition it posed to purely descriptive artistic portrayals,13 painters
began to assert that art was less about faithful representation of reality
and instead that "we must look at it, not through it."14
To achieve this goal, the Impressionists redefined painting until
art was "no longer a 'window' [into the picture], but a screen made up
of flat patches of color."' 5 This transition away from realistic repre-
sentation to subjective impression even gave the technique its name.
In 1874, an art critic savaged the first independent exhibition of the
innovators with a critique entitled "Exhibition of the Impression-
ists."16 The title mocked one of Monet's works, Impression, Sunrise.17
9 Id. at 82-85 (discussing negative popular opinion about the "Salon des Ref-
us6s" at the time).
10 See id. at 82.
11 See H.W. JANSON & ANTHONY F. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 740 (6th ed. rev. 2004)
("[Luncheon on the Grass] offended the morality of the day by placing the nude and
nattily attired figures in an outdoor setting without allegorical overtones. Even worse,
the neutral title offered no 'higher' significance.").
12 Napoleon III himself pronounced the painting "immodest"-an irony coming
from a prince not noted as a paragon of morality in his own life. REWALD, supra note
6, at 85.
13 JANSON &JANSON, supra note 11, at 742 ("Painting needed to be rescued from
competition with the camera.").
14 Id. (discussing the work of tdouard Manet).
15 Id.
16 See REwALD, supra note 6, at 318.
17 Id. at 318-24 (printing the sarcastic critique of the Impressionists' style in its
entirety); see also GOMBRICH, supra note 3, at 519 ("[The 1874 exhibition] contained a
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The actual photographic reality of sunlight-or air or water or human
form and visage-began to matter less than the artist's feelings and
sensations when looking at a scene.
Impressionism's triumph, then, lay in its emphasis on the origi-
nality of the artist's own viewpoint, whether expressed in different sub-
jects, colors, or techniques. "All the old bogeys of 'dignified subject-
matter,' of 'balanced compositions,' of 'correct drawing,' were laid to
rest. The artist was responsible to no one but his own sensibilities for
what he painted and how he painted it."18 The Impressionists irrevo-
cably changed art through their self-referential questioning of form
and structure. Lost was a sense of art as the depiction of defined real-
ity. The innovators brought a striking new way of seeing the world,
not necessarily as it is but through the lens of subjective artistic
sensibilities.
Nor were the Impressionists the final originators in the self-refer-
ential march of artistic imagination. From the 1870s onward, artists
continued to break down structure and form, instead emphasizing the
reach of their own feelings and imagination. By the twentieth cen-
tury, artists were shifting away from the romantic and emotional and
were beginning to exploit the revolution in technique to its fullest
extent. Picasso was developing early Cubist forms,19 and by 1910
other artists, including Georges Braque, had embraced the abstract
artistic style.20 Their technique provided a definitive statement of sub-
jectivity. As one leading art historian explained, "For a century that
questioned the very concept of absolute truth or value, Cubism cre-
ated an artistic language of intentional ambiguity."21 Or to put it
another way:
Cubism controverted principles that had prevailed for centuries.
For the traditional distinction between solid form and the space
around it, Cubism substituted a radically new fusion of mass and
void. In place of earlier perspective systems that determined the
precise location of discrete objects in illusory depth, Cubism offered
an unstable structure of dismembered planes in indeterminate spa-
picture by Monet which the catalogue described as 'Impression: sunrise'-it was the
picture of a harbour seen through the morning mists. One of the critics found this
title particularly ridiculous, and he referred to the whole group of artists as 'The
Impressionists.' He wanted to convey that these painters did not proceed by sound
knowledge, and thought that the impression of a moment was sufficient to be called a
picture. The label stuck.").
18 GOMBRICH, supra note 3, at 522.
19 See JANSON & JANSON, supra note 11, at 811-12.
20 Id. at 812.
21 ROBERT ROSENBLUM, CUBISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART 14 (2001).
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tial positions. Instead of assuming that the work of art was an illu-
sion of a reality that lay beyond it, Cubism proposed that the work
of art was itself a reality that represented the very process by which
nature is transformed into art.22
In other words, the Cubists replaced whatever form the Impressionists
and their prot6g~s had retained. Instead of form and structure, they
left an intensely probing introspection.
There is no need to survey the whole of the twentieth century
because the shift away from defined forms and standards was well and
irreversibly underway in the century's earliest years.23 In fact, the
Cubists' impact on twentieth century art is summed up well as "a trum-
pet call that both asserts [the artists'] freedom to create in a new style
and provides them with the mission to define the meaning of their
times-and even to reshape society through their art."2 4 Artists have
learned this lesson well. The loosening of conventional technique in
favor of personal sensibility has been so overwhelming that today it
can sometimes be difficult for the layman to distinguish artistic mas-
terpieces from children's scribbling. That is not, however, to con-
demn the artists who have questioned the very essence of their craft,
ironically enriching it in the process.
B. Subjectivity in Music
Changes in music have been no less dramatic than those in the
visual arts. I focus in this section on changes in classical, rather than
popular, music, although the increasing emphasis on spontaneity,
emotion, and unconstrained expression are even more the trend in
popular music than in classical compositions.
The changes in music are perhaps harder for the layman to grasp
than the changes in art. The uninitiated may not comprehend the
full depth of the changes wrought by a Cubist, but even a superficial
glance serves to illustrate the differences between a Paul Klee and a
Caravaggio. In contrast, while the differences between Bach and
Bart6k are audibly apparent, their significance is not as clear to the lay
listener.
But the trend in auditory arts has been no less striking than in
visual ones. Music evolved from the technique-bound Baroque and
Classical periods of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven,25 through
22 Id. at 13.
23 See id. at 13-14 (describing the early development of Cubism).
24 JANSON &JANSON, supra note 11, at 668 (describing modernism).
25 See generally MANFRED F. BUKOFZER, MUSIC IN THE BAROQUE ERA (1947) (discuss-
ing the evolution of music from the early to late Baroque periods); DONALD JAY
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the aptly named Romantic period of Mendelssohn, Schumann, and
Wagner in the nineteenth century,26 to the disparate styles of what can
only be termed twentieth-century music, typified by Debussy, Stravin-
sky, Shostakovich, and even more recent innovators.27 Throughout
this progression, there has been a move toward rejecting form and
structure in favor of a less regulated expressiveness in which the com-
poser sets the form of composition rather than working within
defined and borrowed strictures.
The changes in music are best understood by referencing the
Baroque masters' rich and intricate designs. The works of J.S. Bach
and others are "distinguished by a fully established tonality which reg-
ulated chord progressions, dissonance treatment, and the formal
structure."28 Without fully unpacking all that this sentence describes,
it is enough to observe that the music of the Baroque and later the
Classical period utilized highly formalized harmony and structure.
Formality, of course, has a discipline and beauty all its own, com-
bining feeling and framework in a manner that enhances the value of
each. The emphasis on structure is most familiarly illustrated by the
famous sonata form, used extensively by Classical composers such as
Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven.2 9 It is worth quoting at some length
to explain the concept. Classical composition often consisted of:
(1) An exposition (usually repeated), incorporating a first theme or
group of themes in the tonic; a second, often more lyrical, theme or
group in the dominant or the relative major (if the movement is in
a minor key); and a closing, frequently cadential, theme also in the
dominant or relative major . . . . (2) A development section in which
motives or themes from the exposition are presented in new aspects
or combinations and in the course of which modulations may be
GROUT & CLAUDE V. PALiSCA, A HISTORY OF WESTERN Music 807-08 (5th ed. 1996)
(defining the Baroque period as 1580-1730 and the Classical period as 1730-1820).
26 See generally ALFRED EINSTEIN, MUSIC IN THE RoMANTIc ERA (1947) (providing
an overview of music's Romantic period); GROUT & PALISCA, supra note 25, at 818
(defining the Romantic period as 1810-1890).
27 See generally WILLIAM W. AUSTIN, MUSIC IN THE 20T CENTURY (1966) (providing
an overview of the developments in twentieth-century music).
28 BUKOFZER, supra note 25, at 17.
29 See, e.g., GERALD ABRAHAM, THE CONCISE OxFORD HISTORY OF MUSIc 523 (1979)
(discussing large collections of sonatas by Clementi, C.P.E. Bach, Haydn, Beethoven,
and a number of lesser-known composers); id. at 498 (discussing several Mozart sona-
tas for pianoforte, a prototype of the piano); id. at 618 (discussing Beethoven's cello
sonatas, Op. 5, and his violin sonatas, Op. 12); GROUT & PAUSCA, supra note 25, at 471
("Most instrumental music of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, and their contemporaries,
whether called sonata, trio, string quartet, or symphony, is written in three or four
movements of contrasting mood and tempo.").
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made to relatively remote keys. (3) A recapitulation, where the mate-
rial of the exposition is restated in the original order but with all
themes in the tonic; following the recapitulation there may be a
coda.30
Sonatas, trios and quartets, concertos and symphonies each had their
own sets of forms and standards, not only for the composition as a
whole, but also for the individual movements within it.
In contrast, Romantic composers in the nineteenth century emp-
tied the sonata form of many of its technical attributes.3 ' A typical
example suffices. Franz Liszt's B-minor Sonata, composed in
1852-1853, is not even divided into three or four movements. 32
Instead, it consists of several musical themes introduced in the first
fifteen measures, after which the piece solely "consists of a gigantic,
highly dramatic development section."33 Liszt decided to discard
form and structure in the interests of creating a work "'beautiful
beyond all comprehension, great, lovable, deep, and noble-sub-
lime."' 3 4 Formality came to be seen as an impediment to this kind of
feeling, rather than a vehicle for it.
Indeed, Romantic music's very name suggests a focus on the sub-
jective instead of structure or technique. The emphasis demanded a
relaxing of musical form in the interests of exploring new frontiers of
emotion. As one historian explained,
Expression of feeling became more intense and personal as the
1800s progressed. The conventions of form and tonal relations
were trespassed beyond limits that had once seemed reasonable.
The imagination wandered into unexplored realms that sought to
recapture a cherished past or to reach a wonderful future. A spirit
of longing, of yearning after an impossible fulfillment, haunted
most Romantic art . . . .
Indeed, the same author later noted, "Some nineteenth-century writ-
ers called instrumental music the ideal Romantic art, because, being
free from the burden of words, it could perfectly communicate pure
emotion."3 6 This same emphasis expanded to an unprecedented
degree throughout the nineteenth century.
30 GROUT & PALISCA, supra note 25, at 471-72.
31 See, e.g., EINSTEIN, supra note 26, at 142.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. (quoting composer Richard Wagner's enthusiastic comments about Liszt's
piece).
35 GROUT & PALIscA, supra note 25, at 563-64.
36 Id. at 564.
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Even the titles and subjects adopted by Romantic composers
evince a broadening individualism. No one in the Baroque period
wrote operas with titles like Der Ring des Nibelungen (The Ring of the
Nibelung), Wagner's masterpiece dealing with Norse legend and
mythology. Nor is Wagnerian opera unique. Schumann's pieces, with
titles like Butterflies, Carnaval, Fantasy Pieces, and Scenes from Childhood
represent a lighthearted counterpoint to Wagner's operatic edifices.37
They "suggest that Schumann wanted listeners to associate them with
extramusical poetic fancies"38 and are thus typical of the Romanti-
cism's new emotionalism.
While the intense feeling of Romanticism may have faded some-
what in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ques-
tioning of form and structure in music remained a pervasive trend as
the Modernist era began. Indeed, if anything, it grew stronger. The
trend was evident on a technical level, as the move to develop new
musical themes spawned challenges to the very structure of notes
themselves. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, com-
posers such as Wagner and Debussy experimented with snatches of
atonal music, in which the traditional major/minor relationships
between notes are discarded.39 Atonality was dramatically expanded
in the twentieth century by Arnold Schoenberg, who spearheaded a
significant musical innovation by choosing to treat all twelve notes of
the traditional scale indiscriminately in many of his works. 40 This
change marked a stunning departure41 from the traditional twelve
tone system that had been used since at least the seventeenth century,
37 See id. at 598 (discussing Schumann's musicial compositions and style).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 733 ("Much late Romantic music, especially in Germany, had been tend-
ing toward atonality. Chromatic melody lines and chord progressions-in the music
of Wagner, for example-had resulted in passages in which no tonal center could be
perceived; but these passages, relatively short and exceptional, were anchored in a
tonal context."); see also ALEx Ross, THE REST Is NOISE 39-45 (2007) (discussing
Debussy's flirtations with atonality in his works).
40 GROUT & PALISCA, supra note 25, at 733 (discussing Schoenberg's decision to
"treat all twelve notes of the octave as equal instead of regarding some of them as
chromatically altered tones of a diatonic scale"); Ross, supra note 39, at 55-61 (ana-
lyzing Schoenberg's life and his use of atonality).
41 See AusTIN, supra note 27, at 194-222 ("Disagreeing about the meanings and
values of [Schoenberg's] principles, (musicians] had to agree that Schoenberg
somehow contributed as much as any one man to the musical culture of the 20th
century. . . .").
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and it allowed composers even more freedom to express their
individuality. 42
Nor were Schoenberg's changes an isolated phenomenon. In a
logical counterpoint to his work, other composers experimented with
eliminating distinct notes entirely, 43 replacing them instead with a
continuum of sound.44 Yet a third group questioned the very nature
of musical composition itself, calling for significant portions of their
pieces to be improvised by musicians rather than writing them out in
full. 4 5 Perhaps the most striking example of this technique is John
Cage's famous 1952 composition, 4'33" (four minutes and thirty-three
seconds), in which a performer sits in complete silence for the time
mentioned in the title.4 6 The "music" consists of ambient noise that
occurs in the concert hall.4 7
The goal is not to denounce all these changes, any more than it is
to suggest that they were adopted by all twentieth-century composers.
Rather, such sharp departures, even from the basic concept of what
music was supposed to be, illustrate just how much musical form and
structure have been supplanted by the self-referential ingenuity of
individual artists in modem times.
C. Subjectivity in Literature and the Sciences
It would be repetitive at this point to dwell on changes in the
literary and scientific worlds that mirror those in art and music. For
one thing, the trends in these fields are more elusive and ambiguous.
Even here, however, examples of structural rejections abound. One
such example in literature is the dramatic contrast between the rigid
quatrains and couplets of Shakespeare's sonnets and the flowing syn-
tax, punctuation, and grammar of E.E. Cummings.48 The works of
both poets expressed emotion, often passionately in the case of Shake-
42 See GROUT & PALISCA, supra note 25, at 751; cf Ross, supra note 39, at 41
("Musicians and listeners had long agreed that certain intervals, or pairs of notes,
were 'clear,' and that others were 'unclear.' The quoted words can be found on a
cuneiform tablet from the Sumerian city of Ur.").
43 GROUT & PAUISCA, supra note 25, at 751-52 (discussing examples).
44 See id. at 751 (discussing the use of "a continuum, an unbroken range of sound
from the lowest to the highest audible frequencies, without distinguishing separate
tones of fixed pitch").
45 Id. at 753-54.
46 Ross, supra note 39, at 368-69.
47 Id. at 369.
48 Compare, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 18, in SHAKESPEARE's SONNETS 19
(Stephen Booth ed., 2000), with E.E. CUMMINGS, anyone lived in a pretty how town, in
SELECTED POEMS 109 (Richard S. Kennedy ed., 1994). Cummings's name has fre-
quently been written in lowercase letters in a nod to his unique style, although the
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speare. But what distinguishes Cummings's work and that of other
twentieth-century writers from their Shakespearean ancestors is the
degree to which they have rejected structured stanzas and rigid iambic
pentameter in favor of poetry regulated chiefly by the bounds of the
poet's own genius and creativity.
Cummings's work rejected not only classical rhyme and meter,
but also the minimal structure provided by horizontal lines of text,
composing poems in which the letters and words are artistically
splashed across the page. 4 9 It is hardly necessary to point out that
Cummings would not have written what he did in Shakespeare's time,
or vice versa.
Whether the influence of Proust upon literature or Freud upon
psychology or Einstein upon physics have introduced the world to
irreversible self-referentialism, subjectivity, and relativeness would no
doubt provoke intense debate. None of these giants entirely elimi-
nated form and structure from their respective disciplines. Indeed,
Einstein's theories prompted the ongoing search by physicists for a
Theory of Everything that could bring order to the universe. Psychol-
ogy, though initially heavily dependent on Freud's subliminal empha-
sis, has relied with increasing regularity on the hard sciences both in
an attempt to enhance respect for the discipline and in an effort to
quantify medical diagnosis of illnesses. Even so, the parameters of
form and structure have been bent and stretched in every discipline,5 0
and a world of objective points of reference no longer exists.5 1 I
would argue that on balance this trend is more beneficial than not,
but that is hardly the point. It is, at the very least, a necessary and
inevitable trend, as science probes new realms of knowledge and each
new artistic generation builds upon the genius of its predecessor by
making its own distinctive mark. The question for our time is whether
law should take up this cudgel of modernity and smash inherited
structures-should we look at the pervasive loss of form in art and
follow suit? I would argue emphatically that we should not.
writer himself did not expressly approve. See CHRISTOPHER SAWYER-LAUCANRo, E.E.
CUMMINGS, at ix (2004).
49 See, e.g., E.E. CUMMINGS, r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r, in SELECTED POEMS, supra note 48, at
42.
50 For an example from a different artistic discipline, see Alastair Macaulay, Bal-
lroom: More Sexily, Less Strictly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at C1 (explaining that, from a
dance critic's perspective, professional ballroom dancing "has grown unrecognizable
in recent decades" due to loosening of the art form).
51 See Turley, supra note 2, at 73 ("New scientific theories, particularly atomic
physics, had freed artists of the hold of the objects they painted. As Wassily Kandinsky
said, '[a]ll things become flimsy, with no strength or certainty.'" (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting SAM HUNTER &JOHN JACOBUS, MODERN ART 10 (1985)).
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II. LAW AND THE ARTISTIC TEMPTATION
The blossoming of subjectivity and boundless self-expression in
the arts during the past two centuries has been powerful. The influ-
ence is so strong that the allure for judges to seek analogies in law is
nearly irresistible.
The legal and artistic processes do bear some superficial resem-
blance. 52 Both disciplines are indebted to rules and standards that
traditionally defined the fields of play. And soon enough the forms
and structures began to chafe and to stand in the way-of artists seek-
ing to put personal feelings on display and of judges seeking to reach
a personally preferred result. As Professor Turley notes, "Abstract art
and [modern] constitutional theory share a tendency toward the tran-
scendent. Both often begin with an object but then transcend that
object through a process of creative translation."53
Additionally, art's subjectivity provides an example that judges
would naturally find alluring. It would be strange if there were no
temptation for jurists to follow the astonishing successes of musicians,
writers, and painters who have broadened humanity's horizons and
enhanced their own reputations by expressing exactly what they felt.
Indeed, successive waves of feeling in different fields of artistic
endeavor mirrored and influenced each other. Thus Stravinsky's
music of the early twentieth century contains passages "splintered into
fragmentary motifs by rhythmic patterns as jagged and shifting as the
angular planes of Cubist painting and equally destructive of a tradi-
tional sense of fluid sequence."54 James Joyce's Ulysses and Virginia
Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway mirror Cubist painting in the way "events are
recomposed in a complexity of multiple experiences and interpreta-
tions that evoke the simultaneous and contradictory fabric of reality
itself."55 This cross-pollination of technique in the arts inspires judges
to experiment with replacing structure and logic with personal
subjectivity.
It would be odd indeed if judges did not somehow feel left out
should they fail to devise a Judicial Impressionism or Cubism of their
own. Perhaps most tellingly, judges may fear that history will judge
them as it has those contemporary critics of Impressionism. In dis-
cussing the rejection faced by Monet and his contemporaries, one art
historian spoke of the "conspicuous failure of the public to recognize
52 See id. at 70.
53 Id. at 71.
54 ROSENBLUM, supra note 21, at 43.
55 Id.
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novel methods."5 6 Though not written about the law, the statement
could apply with equal force there. Justice William Brennan voiced
the common concern when he spoke of the desire not to "turn a blind
eye to social progress and eschew adaption of overarching principles
to changes of social circumstance."5 7 It is all too human that judges
would be alarmed about missing an important legal innovation just as
the public and the establishment painters of nineteenth-century
France missed one of the great revolutions in art.
So the everlasting temptation is to embrace modernity before it
leaves us behind. For who wishes to be on the wrong side on progress,
watching alone the departing train with all others aboard? In expres-
sing the hope that judges would prove self-consciously empathetic,
President Barack Obama took up the modern artistic impulse to put
the judge's own feelings upon the legal canvass: " [W] e need some-
body who's got the heart-the empathy-to recognize what it's like to
be a young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it's like
to be poor or African-American or gay or disabled or old-and that's
the criteria by which I'll be selecting my judges."5 8 And in emphasiz-
ing the role that one's own ethnic identity should play on the bench,
then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor adapted the self-referential qualities of
modern artistic endeavor to law itself. Comments highlighted the
artistic perspective in judging, including assertions such as "'gender
and national origins may and will make a difference in our judging,"'
"'there is no objective stance but only a series of perspectives,"' and
"'[p]ersonal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see,'
in addition to her famous "'wise Latina woman' statement.5 9
I intend no disrespect, only profound disagreement, with two sin-
cere and dedicated public servants. And my disagreement is not over
whether the world view their sentiments express is right or wrong, but
that it has no place in judging. The statements are merely the latest in
a long line of pronouncements by artistic jurisprudes and policymak-
ers.60 The modern artists may be more aggressive in questioning form
56 GOMBRICH, supra note 3, at 416.
57 William J. Brennan,Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporay Ratifica-
tion, 27 S. TEX. L. REv. 433, 436 (1986).
58 Barack Obama, Speech at the Planned Parenthood Conference in Washing-
ton, D.C. (July 17, 2007).
59 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, A Judge's View ofJudging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2009, at A21 (compiling statements by Justice Sotomayor).
60 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 8, 1908),
reprinted in 43 CONG. REc. 21 (1908) ("The chief lawmakers in our country may be,
and often are, the judges, because they are the final seat of authority. . . . The deci-
sions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic
and social philosophy . . . .").
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and structure than the many jurists who would emulate them, but the
artists have at least remained true and faithful to the essence of their
calling. The judicial artists by contrast have splashed paint where it
does not belong. While I doubt their effort to incorporate artistic
technique into law was a conscious one, the effect was surely a unify-
ing one, to make art and law of a piece.
III. OBJECTiVE LAW
Temptations exist to be resisted. Not that it ever hurts to have
another piece of chocolate, and not that anyone wholly succeeds in
willing away the seductive powers of the self-destructive. But law must
give it a try. What is good and laudable in art is on that very account
corrupting and impoverishing in law-the beauty of the artist's crea-
tion is to be admired, not adopted. For the process of creating law,
law's purpose in society, and its power when invoked are all dramati-
cally different from their counterparts in artistic expression. These
crucial differences show how misguided it is for judges to view them-
selves as "legal artists" composing judicial masterpieces with the palate
of language while rejecting the form and structure legal texts provide.
A. Process: Individualist Art; Representative Law
Perhaps the artist and the lawyer, like the farmer and the cowboy
in Oklahoma', can be friends united oddly in the recognition that the
processes by which art and law are created could not be more differ-
ent. At its core, art is typically created by a single individual. It is an
act of self-expression intimately tied to the artist's personality, exper-
iences, and talents. In the end, it all comes down to the power of one.
As such, self-expression and self-reference are necessary and unavoida-
ble aspects of the artistic process. The creator invites the viewers or
listeners to discover him or her, and in that refracted light to learn
more about themselves. Without the spark of singular creativity, it is
unlikely that art could be art at all, only a rote, mechanical reproduc-
tion that we would cease to appreciate as artistic.
In stark contrast, laws are collective. They reflect either the
majoritarian choices of the people themselves or the choices of the
people through their chosen representatives. Rather than individual
masterpieces, laws are supposed to be communal composites arrived
at by the people working through defined processes. The Constitu-
tion itself is a compact entered into collectively by "We the People" to
"form a more perfect union."61 Individuals may put their mark on
61 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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legislation (Ohio Senator John Sherman's Antitrust Act6 2 or the
McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act6 3 of more recent
memory come to mind), but even when a particular person champi-
ons a piece of legislation it remains the ultimate creation of forces far
larger than himself.
Several critical conclusions flow from the distinction in the way
law and art are created. Most importantly, judges who rely on singular
emotion or distinctive experience in rendering decisions are planting
the seeds of artistic creation in terrain where they do not belong.
Even the greatest judges have confused the creative differences. Per-
haps Justice Benjamin Cardozo's statement that law "in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation" can be excused as an observa-
tion largely confined to the common law.64 But this transposition of
artistic license to judicial latitude is elitist in the extreme. A great soci-
ety will appreciate art and even be influenced by art, but it has not
consented to be governed by the artistic impulse transposed to law.
Though artists and judges may move in different circles, each profes-
sion comprises its own small and barely penetrable sanctums, not even
intended to be representative in any sense. Thus it requires a certain
chutzpah, whether conscious or not, to assert that empathy, self-
expression, or subjectivity should be used by judges in reaching legal
determinations. When the will of a single individual supersedes the
collective will of the lawmaking process, we have adopted the artistic
model, but without any of the lasting beauty of the artist's creation to
show for it.
The tendency to indulge the artistic impulse is not confined to
liberals or conservatives. In two cases that have framed the modern
era of constitutional law-Roe v. Wade65 and District of Columbia v. Hel-
ley66-judges either painted constitutional rights onto blank canvass
or interpreted ambiguous provisions in a manner that degraded the
representative quality of law and maximized the opportunity for indi-
vidual sentiments and preferences. No matter how wise, the judicial
artist who bases decisions on his individual feelings and experiences
62 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
63 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 2 & 47 U.S.C.).
64 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921)
("As the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon the nature
of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have
grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation ...
65 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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risks impoverishing legal discourse rather than enriching it. Diversity
of experience comes from aggregating people's backgrounds demo-
cratically. The individual perspective from the bench is all too often
idiosyncratic, reflecting a particular upbringing or identity, and the
democratic process is intended to submerge precisely that.
Artistically, there is no such conflict because art is not created by
the people. The poet, composer, or painter is the creator and can do
as he pleases with his creations. But only a creator possesses such
authority. It would be absurd to suggest that an observer could draw
mustaches on masterpieces or add new themes to a musical score or
new lines to a poem without radically altering the composition of the
artist.6 7 Apart from the danger of destroying a masterpiece, the real
problem with such an act is that the observer is not the creator of the
work and thus is not the proper party for deciding what changes to it
are appropriate. In the same way, ajudge cannot modify law based on
the urge to empathize because he was not ultimately responsible for
the law's creation. That privilege and responsibility lies alone with the
creators of law-the people and their duly elected representatives.
Nor does the existence of judicial discretion undermine this
point. Of course no one argues that judges are robots. Judges must
daily exercise good judgment in reaching decisions. Judges are
expected, for example, to exercise discretion in resolving factual dis-
putes and ambiguities in the law itself.68 However, the fact that some
discretion lies at the heart of the judicial function does not justify
utilizing personal, subjective criteria either to create ambiguity or to
resolve it.
Empathy has no place in the typical factual determination. Imag-
ine John and Emily together in a meadow. The artist is free to use
their appearance as a springboard for whatever flight of imaginative
fancy he desires. Insofar as their appearance together in the meadow
is legally relevant, the judge has discretion only to determine what
actually happened when and while they were there. Only then can he
67 Marcel Duchamp's famous work, L.H.O.O.Q, is effective as an attack on high
art precisely because it is a bearded and mustached parody of the Mona Lisa. See
WitLUAM S. RUBIN, DADA AND SURREAuIsT ART 37 (1968). If the letters of the title are
pronounced quickly in French, the result is an off-color remark about the Mona Lisa.
Id.
68 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228-29 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (discussing the challenges of ambiguity inherent in all legal documents);
Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 304 (1989) ("According to Locke and now Madison, political principles are
complex ideas that are liable to be indistinctly conceived, and the indistinctness of
these complex ideas inevitably produces obscurity.").
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proceed to draw conclusions. In other words, the external reality that
is altogether at the service of the artist is the master of the judge,
although a judge's well-honed judgment may inform his understand-
ing of what likely took place.
Similarly, the resolution of legal questions is no more amenable
than factual determination to the freedom and feeling of artistic pro-
cess. For the very form and structure that artists often perceive as an
impediment to their work are, precisely because of their collective
nature, the judge's sole sources of authority. An artist does not need
form and structure for legitimacy. A judge has no sanction to decide
other than what a particular text means and whether it applies to the
situation under consideration. The artist's feelings as caught on can-
vas are supreme. The judge's feelings about the merits of the legal
text before him are, or should be, largely irrelevant. To be sure, there
may be disputes over whether a legal text actually applies. But even as
to an ambiguous text, the judge must use maxims of statutory inter-
pretation to determine what others meant. Inclusio unius exclusio omnes,
for example, ties the hands of ajudge both as to included and omitted
terms. The artist is free to include and exclude, to add and subtract,
to alter at will-the preconceived structure need mean little to him.
Most importantly, the Constitution occupies a place in the law
unlike anything found in art. It exists precisely to cabin the free-flow-
ing exercise of discretion so valuable to creative expression. Indeed,
all judges swear on their ascension to the bench to judge "agreeably to
the constitution and laws of the United States."69 That level of respect
to a formal standard certainly has no equivalent among artists, who
raise their right hands to no one, and it illustrates the distinct role the
Constitution plays.
Suggestions that the text of the Constitution should be inter-
preted or modified in light of "evolving norms and traditions of our
society" through a "dynamic process of interpretation" miss the point
of having a Constitution in the first place.70 The evolving Constitu-
tion is, in essence, an advisory Constitution, and it indulges the ten-
dency of judges to assume artistic freedom with what is at bottom a
social compact.71
69 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 453 (2006)).
70 See GOODWIN Liu ET AL., KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 2 (2009).
71 Indeed, as Michael McConnell has written:
If the Constitution is authoritative only to the extent that it accords with our
independent judgments about political morality and structure, then the
Constitution itself is only a makeweight: what gives force to our conclusions
is simply our beliefs about what is good, just, and efficient. Taken to its
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The collective effort needed to create the Constitution simultane-
ously thwarted the individual judge's freedom to tamper with it. It is
no answer to say that "when it comes to the many provisions that are
phrased as broad and general principles, change rather than con-
stancy in interpretation may be necessary to preserve constitutional
meaning over time."72 For that view is so broad and so open-ended
that the transformation of judge into artist is rendered well-nigh
complete.
Credit the progressives for creative brushstrokes in repainting the
damaged rhetoric of living constitutionalism in appealing garb. The
trouble is that any interpretative system that encourages judges to use
"the entire tradition of opinions and precedents that have sought to
vindicate and implement the Constitution"73 still firmly ensconces
individual judges as artists by encouraging them to select from a
boundless mosaic of interpretative inputs to create the masterpiece of
their choosing. To the extent that the judge is rendered supreme to
text, structure, and history, he has become the artist whose control
over his canvas is complete. The individualism envisioned in art will
have triumphed over the collectivism embodied in law, and the dam-
age to governance by democratic means will be considerable.
Now, of course, the Constitution and laws empower and indeed
obligate judges to protect certain individual rights. And outside the
constitutional realm, there are notable areas where judges are explic-
itly directed to exercise discretion that can be empathetic and subjec-
tive. For instance, sentencing often involves an inherently
discretionary component. 74 But this fact does not support uncabined
self-expression in judging. Judges are notjustified in exercising empa-
thy in sentencing because of some intrinsic artistic right to ignore text
and structure. Rather, the text enacted by the legislature expressly
granted judges a limited power to weigh various sentencing criteria in
specific situations in the hope of providing flexible sentencing
logical conclusion, this line of argument does not provide a reason for treat-
ing the Constitution as authoritative; it instructs us to disregard the Constitu-
tion whenever we disagree with it.
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1127, 1129 (1998).
72 LiU ET AL., supra note 70, at 26.
73 Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 11,
23 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
74 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 1-14 (2009), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/2009guid/GL 2 00 9 .pdf (discussing the history and goals of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, specifically the desire to constrain judicial discretion
while still retaining the flexibility necessary to respond to specific cases).
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schemes rather than rigidly rules-based ones.7 5 That judicial discre-
tion can be expanded or limited by the legislature as desired. It would
be inaccurate in the extreme to extrapolate from legislatively allowed
discretion to justify full blown, self-expressive judicial artistry in all
areas of the law. The notion that if artists can do it, why not we, is
insidious to law, and the freedoms modern artists have understanda-
bly claimed for themselves supply the very rationale for a dramatically
different judicial function.
B. Purpose: Provocative Art; Stabilizing Law
Just as the processes by which art and law are created are distinct,
so also their purposes vary widely. Artistic expression generally is
intended to provoke a response, whether verbal or nonverbal, individ-
ual or collective. By contrast, through an exquisite balance of liberty
and order, law is intended to provide structure in society. This differ-
ence again explains why the revolt against formality, so enriching in
the artistic context, should not be imitated in law.
It will help to reflect just a moment on the extraordinary role and
purposes of the arts. The goal of artistic creation is to enlighten,
entertain, or even provoke those who experience it. Art is supposed
to be an experience through which people partake of new ideas, new
experiences, or even new revelations about themselves. Music uplifts,
art beautifies, literature inspires, among many other things.
Because the purpose of art is so broad and so variable, the widest
range of expression is needed. The artist needs latitude in reaching
out and interacting with those who come in contact with the work.
Certain paintings may go in and out of style, some poems may not
find a following, and styles of music may come in and out of vogue.
These changing, decentralizing developments are healthy in the artis-
tic arena because they provide the richest range of inspiration both
for artists and their public.
In contrast, law's great intention is not to provoke. It aims to
avoid and to settle disagreements through pre-determined proce-
dures. At its most basic level, law is supposed to provide stability and
predictability to society. "[I]n order for the exercise of coercive
power to be justified it must be imposed on individuals who are capa-
ble of conforming their behavior to its demands and who have the
75 Cf Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 848
(1972) ("When discretion is denied the law dictates which standards should be
applied by all the judges. When discretion is allowed each judge is entitled to follow
different reasons but he must believe that they are the best. Otherwise, discretion can
be equated only with arbitrariness, whim, and caprice.").
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opportunity to do so."76 Law is intended to set the standards by which
people behave, business is conducted, and disputes are resolved. It is
true that law can be a powerful agent for social change.77 However,
that very power derives from law's intended status as society's
roadmap for resolving disputes. When a new law reflects or promotes
changes in society, it does so because society recognizes that one of
law's purposes is to establish new rules of the game.
The distinction between the purposes of law and art can be illus-
trated by a purely hypothetical example. Suppose a young composer
wrote a new piece for the cello and wanted it performed. Somehow,
this unknown composer was able to hire the world's most accom-
plished cellist and the Lincoln Center for the premier performance.
However, on the night of the performance, the cellist decides (cor-
rectly) that the new piece is terrible and should never be played.
Instead he brilliantly improvises what is immediately recognized as the
greatest performance of his fabulous career. People on the street are
still speaking of the performance months later, and a generation of
musicians finds inspiration in it.
In spite of this amazing artistic success, the renowned cellist
would have violated the terms of his contract to play the new composi-
tion. Law's purpose is to stabilize society and to prevent such sur-
prises, even if they serendipitously turn out well. The fact that an
intentional breach of contract is an artistic success is irrelevant. A
judge would not be justified in excusing the breach based on the
musical triumph, no matter how moving the judge found the occa-
sion. The art properly inspired the ages. The law properly held the
artist to account.
Because of this fact, it is inappropriate to institutionalize the emo-
tions of judges. As artists are viewed through the purposes of art,
judges must be seen through the aims of law. Art is supposed to chal-
lenge assumptions and to catalyze change. Law is supposed to chan-
nel this same change, to provide a stable foundation upon which
society can build new structures in accordance with democratic will.
Art is useless as an agent of change if artists are purely imitative of
76 Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Deterninacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 582 (1993).
77 See, e.g., David E. Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning, Social Change, and the Law,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 894, 938 (1987) ("In some cases, law is an attempt to alter common-
sense ideas of the world in specific areas. Law can be in tension with commonsense
theories about the world; it can be an attempt by the legislature or the courts to alter
such theories. In this form, law is an ideology imposed from without that seeks to
raise the costs of nonadherence so that individuals will alter their pictures of the
world and comply.").
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their peers. Law is useless as a stabilizing force if it varies from day to
day and from judge to judge. Judicial decision making that relies on
the artistic virtues comes dangerously close to negating law's distinc-
tive reason for being-a reason that, if rightly understood, protects
through such ancient instruments as contract and copyright the flour-
ishing of art itself.
C. Power: Persuasive Art; Binding Law
Finally, judges should not aspire to artistic status because it is
improper to commandeer the power of the state to advance their own
subjective interests. Law, unlike art, is a coercive force. Art relies on
aesthetic persuasion for its power. The judge is imbued with authority
precisely because he is not an aesthete, with the idiosyncratic creativity
and talent the term implies.
While many artists could care less about matters of state, others
find it a moral imperative to use the power of their craft in protest.
But that power, while unquestionably significant, is one step removed
from the policy-making process.
It is true that Picasso's Guernica served as a compelling warning
about the dangers of fascism and modern warfare, and Harper Lee's
To Kill a Mockingbird remains a powerful condemnation of racial big-
otry and inequality. That said, a painter obviously lacks the power to
overturn acts of a government, and no author could outlaw racial ine-
quality through a novel. The public must take action on its own in
order for the artist's work to have practical effect. Uncle Tom's Cabin
was effective not because Harriet Beecher Stowe had the power to end
slavery but because its anti-slavery message inspired and energized so
many Americans prior to the Civil War.78
The difference between coercive and persuasive power makes all
the difference. An artist's power flows from internal, individual
genius; in contrast, a judge is vested with external, positional author-
ity. It is not the judge's individuality or background that grants the
power to resolve disputes but rather the judge's position as arbiter
appointed by law. Indeed, that position as arbiter of disputes is the
entire purpose of having judges. To have any hope of fulfilling this
goal, judges must be imbued with official power and the authority to
exercise it even to the detriment of individual litigants. Nevertheless,
there is an implicit understanding, classically evinced by the image of
78 See Darryl Lorenzo Wellington, Uncle Tom's Shadow, THE NATION, Dec. 25, 2006,
at 26 (recognizing Uncle Tom's Cabin as "a social phenomenon and, arguably, the most
influential novel in American history").
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blind justice, that judges are trusted to wield the sword of justice
dispassionately.
It is problematic, to say the least, for a single individual to adopt
artistic methods of reaching decisions but to wield the sword of state
based solely on that individual experience, emotion, or opinion. The
reason that judges are allowed to reach final judgments in cases,
backed by the full force of the government, is that law's form and
structure provides practical limits on judicial discretion. If a judge
ignores those limits and instead views the law as a field for artistic
license, that individual has abdicated the very power that makes him a
judge. The point can be made by a simple reference to attire. The
judge's robe and the violinist's tuxedo may both be black, but the one
emphasizes the solemnity of authority, the other the elegance of musi-
cal expression.
We of course do not think of the sole artist as dictator-such a
comparison would be the furthest thing from our minds. Yet a judi-
cial artist differs from a dictator only in the degree of success the latter
has enjoyed in establishing his singular will. Judges are not "dictators
of the case," entitled to impose judgment based on their impressions
or self-expressive concepts of what the outcome should be. When
they commingle judicial power and artistic method, they become
nothing more than citizen-poets whose views are worth no more or
less than others who try their hands at suasion from the street.
CONCLUSION
One can admire without seeking to emulate. And so it is with law
and art. Because artistic process, purpose, and power is so different
from that of law, art serves as the perfect model for what judges
should not do and ought not to be.
And yet there exists in all of us something of a yearning to be a
free artistic spirit, to capture the essence of modernity so evident in
great art, to throw off the forms and structure of our own profession
as the most innovative artists of our time have thrown off theirs. Just
do it, whispers the inner voice. Just march to our own muse in search
of perfect equity and superior wisdom that in our self-regard, we sup-
pose to reside within our souls. In the interest of empathy, evolving
decency, ethnic identity, or numerous whatevers, exhibit from the
bench those striking brushstrokes of personal vision that, truth to say,
will always win some measure of public applause.
But America does not need jurists of a modern cast of mind to be
a modern nation. The great tides of democratic change will see to
that. And while it is one thing to understand the mores and technol-
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ogy of modern times, it is quite another to adopt the whole ethic of
personal expressiveness that defines the arc of the contemporary arts.
To love another, one must first learn to love the good in oneself. And
what is true of persons is true of professions as well. To love the arts,
judges must first learn to love what is unique and distinctive in the
law. There is no shame in that.
